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Systemic Illusions of Justice in the Biased Courtroom 
Abstract 
Given the ever-growing body of evidence surrounding implicit bias in and beyond the institution 
of the law, there is an equally growing need for the law to respond to the accurate science of 
prejudice in its aspiration to objective practice and just decision-making. Examined herein are 
the existing legal conceptualizations of implicit bias as utilized in the courtroom; implicit bias as 
peripheral to law and implicit bias as effectual in law, but not without active resolution. These 
views and the interventional methods, materials, and procedures they inspire are widely 
employed to appreciably “un-bias” legal actors and civic participants; however, without an 
accurate conceptualization of the science of prejudice in law, these interventions are likely doing 
more harm than good. On the basis that these interventional techniques are unscientific in their 
methodology, reliant upon a misleading theory of transparency of mind, deny the inherently 
emotional and biased origin of the court, and are disseminated largely technocratically, they fail 
to serve their intended purpose. In actuality, they reinforce systemic intergroup biases and are 
seen to produce a lesser objective justice. This project reiterates, as with so many aspects of 
justice, that there must be the same care taken in the address of those structural and institutional 
contributions to implicit bias that the enterprise of law perpetuates in and of itself as have been 
taken in the address of our individual cognitive predispositions toward discrimination. 
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Introduction: The Injustices of Implicit Bias 
It is increasingly difficult to deny the pervasive sort of prejudice that lurks in our legal 
system and wider sociopolitical interactions. Indeed, the field of implicit bias research has 
received a great deal of attention by and beyond the academy in recent years, accumulating an 
impressive body of research1: Statistically, African American women are less likely to receive 
adequate pain management medication in out-patient hospitals2, individuals with Muslim-
sounding names are less likely to be invited to interview for a job when compared to those with 
traditionally Anglican names irrespective of the content of their resumes3, Asian American are 
regularly regarded as less interpersonally proficient than their non-Asian peers4, women are 
universally assumed to be less capable than men in positions of active leadership in the 
workplace5, white children are less likely to receive disciplinary action by pre-school and 
elementary educators than African American children6, African American and Hispanic drivers 
are less likely to be found with contraband than white drivers but are more likely to be stopped, 
searched, and arrested for contraband-related offenses7, and on and on.                                          
These evidences likewise and inevitably spill into the realm of the court: Individuals with  
                                                      
1 See J. Kang, et al. “Implicit Bias in the Courtroom,” UCLA Law Review 59, 1124-86 (2012); B. Nosek, et al. 
“Pervasiveness and Correlates of Implicit Attitudes and Stereotypes,” European Review of Social Psychology 18, 
36-54 (2007); D. Faigman, et al. “Implicit Bias in the Courtroom,” UCLA Law Review 59, 1124-86 (2012). 
2 See K. M. Hoffman, et al. “Racial Bias in Pain Assessment and Treatment Recommendations and False Beliefs 
about Biologic Differences between Blacks and Whites,” PNAS 113, 4296-301 (2016). 
3 See D. Widner and S. Chicoine, “It’s All in the Name: Employment Discrimination against Arab Americans,” 
Sociological Forum 26, 806-23 (2011). 
4 See F. Leong and T. Hayes, “Occupational Stereotyping of Asian Americans,” The Career Development Quarterly 
39, 143-54 (1990). 
5 See A. Eagly and S. Karau, “Role Congruity Theory in Prejudice toward Female Leaders,” Psychological Review 
109, 573-98 (2002).  
6 See United States Government Accountability Office, ed. “Discipline Disparities for Black Students, Boys, and 
Students with Disabilities,” Government Accountability Highlights, K-12 Education Report, 18-258 (2018). 
7 See E. Pierson, et al. “A Large-Scale Analysis of Racial Disparities in Police Stops across the United States,” 
Stanford Open Policing Project Database, 1-23 (2017).  
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prominently Afrocentric features receive longer criminal sentences than those without8; women 
are more likely to be jailed for drug-related offenses than men9; American Indian and Alaskan 
Native juveniles are more likely to be sentenced in adult court than any other demographic10; 
non-white jurors stand twice as likely to be removed from their jury pool11. Especially when 
silhouetted against such stark evidence, it becomes equally difficult to deny the need for 
something, anything, to curtail the felt effects of implicit bias. 
In light of this, the law, now more than ever, has an urgent obligation to understand the 
nature of the assumptions of prejudice it makes in the pursuit of a normatively and objectively 
‘unbiased’ system12. That obligation seemingly centers on the thoughtful address of 
discrimination in the courtroom as both a cognitive and institutional phenomenon. The existing 
narrative of bias goes as so: when it is agreed to be problematic, it is agreed to be problematic at 
the level of the individual, and to resolve it is eliminate it from the decision-making processes of 
that individual. The narrative assumes what Linda Krieger calls “transparency of mind”13, what 
Jerry Kang calls “behavioral realism”14, or what Albert Dzur calls “civic dignity”15 – that we 
have the ability to be less biased by simply being less biased, more aware, and more attuned to 
the ways we exercise our prejudices. It seemingly dismisses the systemic and structural 
                                                      
8 See I. Blair, et al. “The Influence of Afrocentric Facial Features in Criminal Sentencing,” Psychological Science 
15, 674-9 (2004). 
9 See S. Covington and B. Bloom, “Gendered Justice: Women in the Criminal Justice System” in Gendered Justice: 
Addressing Female Offenders, 3-25 (2003). 
10 See M. Leiber, “A Comparison of Juvenile Court Outcomes for Native Americans, African Americans, and 
Whites,” Justice Quarterly 11, 257-79 (1994). 
11 See B. O’Brien and C. Grosso, “Report of Jury Selection Study,” University of Michigan College of Law Digital 
Commons, 1-17 (2011). 
12 J. West, “12 Racist Men: Post-Verdict Evidence of Juror Bias,” Harvard Journal on Racial and Ethnic Justice 72, 
165-204 (2011) at 166. 
13 L. Krieger, “The Content of our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal 
Employment Opportunity,” Stanford Law Review 47, 1161-1248 (1994) at 1167. 
14 J. Kang and M. Banaji, “Fair Measures: A Behavioral Realist Revision of Affirmative Action,” California Law 
Review 94, 1063-118 (2006) at 1064-5. 
15 A. Dzur, Punishment, Participatory Democracy, and the Jury, Oxford University Press, 2012 at 115. 
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contributions to bias16 and ignores the impoverished cognitive access each of us has to our 
biases, irrelevant of our intentions. As will be discussed, this flatfooted conception of prejudice 
in practice and in law has gone on to produce a lesser objective justice.  
It is at this moment that the newest wave of the Implicit Revolution17 is, I believe, 
entering the foreground of the court. The entirety of modern law’s arsenal against (explicit) 
prejudice – an arsenal inherited from Civil Rights-era discrimination law – predates the science, 
even the vocabulary, of today’s kinds of implicit biases by decades. It is generally by these ill 
conceptions of the evidentiary standards of intent and the folk psychology or popular science 
understanding of the brain and behavior that the law continues to attempt to mediate prejudices18. 
From here the problem is further compounded as this distilled folk understanding is rarely seen 
to translate in full from its origin in science to its application in the courtroom19. The 
jurisprudential construction of prejudice in law and order is an overtly emotional, motivated, 
“consciously” cognitive phenomenon, a circumstantial choice that intends and impels; this 
provisional approximation and the living breathing version of it in the world – the version the 
law purports to represent20 – exist now on entirely different, ever-divergent planes.  
The first section of this paper seeks to address just this: I aim to devote sufficient space 
within which to lay side by side the science and the law in hopes of fashioning a wider view of 
contemporary bias and prejudice and those functions, conceptualized in law versus in reality. 
                                                      
16 C. Lawrence, “The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism,” Stanford Law 
Review 39, 317-88 (1987) at 321-3. 
17 The Implicit Revolution is the emergence of the science of unconsciousness, including implicit bias, and ushered 
in the study of prejudice and science in law as we know it now. For a comprehensive history of the Implicit 
Revolution of psychological, cognitive, and neurosciences, see A. Greenwald and M. Banaji, “The Implicit 
Revolution: Reconceiving the Relation between Conscious and Unconscious,” American Psychologist 72, 861-71 
(2017) and J. Kang, “ Trojan Horses of Race,” Harvard Law Review 118, 1489-1593 (2005) at 1514.  
18 Krieger, “Content,” at 1166-77. 
19 J. Kane, “Integrity, Conscience, and Science,” in Nomos vol. XL: Integrity and Conscience, University of New 
York Press (1998), at 115-134. 
20 Krieger, “Content,” at 1217-8. 
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This section puts forth a more nuanced discussion of the working legal view – what I have called 
the “holdover” view – of bias, that attends to the foremost objections of implicit bias reform, 
including those surrounding the normative structure of anti-discrimination law. I then take up 
what is perhaps the more cooperative middle-ground or “interventional” view to clarify the 
problematic use of implicit bias science in law. The subsequent section offers a look at bias in 
action, namely through the role of juries and the bias “grooming” techniques currently in place in 
the voir dire and judgement processes. These bias-grooming techniques and the cases in which 
they are used call into question whether efforts put forth by law to reconcile the (disheartening) 
scientific realities of bias with objectivity and subjectivity are worthwhile at all. I argue that, 
though they respond to the common sense initiatives for a more impartial, “conscious”, and 
objective court, they are doomed to be self-defeating, theoretically and practically, and produce a 
lesser objective justice that reinforces prejudice in law. These first tentative, optimistic steps 
forward may in fact be doing more harm than good. 
 
What We Mean When We Say Bias  
When we talk about bias in law now, we largely do not talk about contemporary science. 
We talk about the stance taken by litigants and judges reflective instead of that outdated social 
psychology of 1980s academy science21. It is a science that deals in the sociological (not 
necessarily cognitive) science of ‘stereotyping’, talks about intergroup biases as normatively 
motivated, and discounts memory research, among other things. When we do talk about bias in 
law through contemporary science, it becomes far more telling. 
For a moment, divorce the notion of bias as prejudice or emotion: As far as the cognitive  
                                                      
21 Krieger, “Content,” at 1174-6. 
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sciences are concerned, bias references the mechanical processes by which the brain makes sense 
of the huge overabundance of stimuli that it receives at a given time. These are processes of 
categorization and schema-development that are necessary to combat this massively disparate 
gap between the amount of stimuli we process and receive, which occurs, by conservative 
measure, at a rate of 50 chunks (pieces of information) to ten million per second22. The brain is 
biased to operate in the most efficient means, so bias, most simply (1) regulates and filters what 
of that overload of stimuli is attended to23; (2) discerns and constructs meaning from sparse or 
unreliable stimuli, as in the case of novel or unfamiliar experience24; (3) acts upon information 
and stimulates predictive action most quickly and efficiently; and (4) aids in governing the 
processes of memory activation and retention. 
If viewed along the lines of these four basic functions, a corresponding twin picture of 
prejudice emerges more clearly: (1) regulation and filtering can be somewhat arbitrary and 
stimuli that goes un-attended may in fact be useful; (2) contextual constructions can be an 
illusory process in which the assumptions made by the brain as based on experience may be false 
or nonexistent; (3) the efficiency by which the brain acts upon information may be to the 
detriment of the most beneficial or productive choice, especially when the neurosensory 
processes are at the mercy of ‘instinctual’ or psychologic responses25; and (4) memory processes 
are, among the brain’s mechanics, wildly unreliable, errorful, and porous to corruption by other 
cognitive functions, leading to potential compounding of biases at the point of later retrieval26. 
                                                      
22 Reference Cognitive Information Processing Theory. 
23 As with mood-congruency effects, base rate fallacies, frequency illusions, confirmation biases, etc. For more on 
this, reference The Cognitive Biases Codex. 
24 As with pareidolia, placebo effects, cross-race effects, denomination effects, projection biases, etc.  
25 As with conjunction fallacies, decoy effects, unity biases, trait ascription biases, the Dunning-Kruger effect, etc. 
26 As with misattribution errors, primacy and recency effects, Google effects, misinformation effects, cryptomnesia, 
etc.  
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Such potential deficiencies in the mechanism of bias can devolve into what is widely 
conceptualized as “prejudice” (that is, negative and discriminatory judgement), and that 
prejudice, being so closely tied to the brain’s regulatory process of bias, can devolve into 
something extremely difficult to suppress or avoid, if not impossible. Bias is foundational to 
prejudice in the same way that marketing is foundational to capitalism, but it is important to note 
the two are not synonymous. Further, bias is not a ‘learned’ contextualization of identity in the 
same way racism or sexism is, both schemas we inescapably absorb from the world around us. 
Given the ways our social identities are increasingly complicated, inter-associative, and 
intersecting, the transformation of bias has been from labored to automatic and from blatant to 
ubiquitous. These processes of bias are examined in the science as being at the level of implicit 
(colloquially, “unconsciously”) or explicit (“consciously”). Explicit biases – what Civil Rights-
era legislation deals with – are those we recognize as such and choose to make expressed or 
unexpressed. Implicit biases – what I am concerned with – are those veiled from ourselves 
because we are unable to access them from the same level of consciousness that created them. 
This simplification is all to say, when bias and prejudice are illustrated in science as 
distinct phenomena – prejudice being the discriminatory one of the two – their distinction 
becomes noticeably lacking in the corresponding legal literature27; bias, prejudice, 
discrimination, discriminatory intent, assumptions, emotions, fears, stereotypes, perceptions, etc. 
are falsely used interchangeably. It may seem an inappreciable one, but it aims at the heart of the 
problem, where it is exactly these kinds of distinctions – between bias and prejudice, between 
implicit and explicit, between motivation and intentionality, between the burden of proof and the 
burden of production – that muddies the waters of legal decision-making and public perception. 
                                                      
27 See Faigman, et al., “Courtroom,” (2012). 
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Bias textures our experiential understanding of the world: It itself is not discriminatory, it cannot 
be “consciously” identified by the individual, and it is not a mediated choice28. Implicit bias is 
even less so identifiable by the individual, to the point of being so covertly persistent as to 
potentially modify the individual’s neurochemistry over time29. Prejudice, in the sense of 
litigious prejudice, is confined to performative discrimination, the likes of which are clearly seen 
in Title VII disparate treatment language; however, implicit biases do not necessarily align with 
our explicit ones, or those that we chose to endorse. This is also to say that bias is not contained 
exclusively within the walls of our brains: Implicit bias is nearly as much a cognitive 
phenomenon as it is a systemic one reflective of the proliferation of prejudice throughout our 
institutional and social lives30. What the law lacks, among other things, is an understanding that 
our biases and prejudices, those very conceptions and ideals, are not entirely, not “consciously” 
our own.  
So, when we talk about bias and the law, we are talking about the Titanic’s iceberg: It’s 
foolhardy to think that the tools of the court can even being to spot what rests below the surface, 
and what may seem as belaboring this distinction is only a necessary illumination of accurate 
science. When unpacked from the legal amalgam of emotionality, it is these kinds of implicit 
prejudices – and the bias-grooming techniques derived from their science – that are legitimately 
threatening to justice-making. Without an accurately informed conception of implicit bias and 
prejudice, bias-grooming in the court becomes a self-defeating exercise in shadowboxing an 
invisible adversary.  
 
                                                      
28 Krieger, “Content,” at 1167. 
29 See B. Cheon, et al. “Contribution of Serotonin Transporter Polymorphism (5-HTTLPR) to Automatic Racial 
Bias,” Personality and Individual Differences 79, 35-38 (2015). 
30 See Lawrence, “The Id,” (1987). 
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 To Be Bias-Free 
Anyone on this side of Brown v. Board of Education31 is likely to concede that behavioral 
sciences do inform the citizen public and therefore do for better or worse inform the law. 
Dismissing what seems to be, at least to me, the obviously unfounded notion of non-bias – that 
we are all absolutely objective and omnisciently impartial – there are generally left two ideas as 
to how this occurs in specific regard to prejudice; the “holdover” formalist view and the common 
sense “interventional” view. 
 
The Holdover View of Bias 
The holdover view of bias – a holdover from Civil Rights-era jurisprudence – puts forth 
the view that the law is right to reject prejudice and bias on the basis that the law should not or 
cannot change32. The former objection, that the law should not accommodate a scientific view of 
prejudice, presses uneasily against evidence to the contrary. On and on, there is so much 
evidence of racial discrimination in jury selection33; that voir dire instruction produces and 
reproduces ethnic and classist prejudice34; of inflamed partisanship in the court, on the bench, in 
the chambers35. It exists in every facet of the process36; CSI and forensic analyses, testimony and 
                                                      
31 347 U.S. 483 (1954). Brown’s footnote 11 was a crucial reframing of the applicability of science in law, and make 
room for the use of social science in the colloquial understanding beyond law and the formal understanding within 
law. Despite questions of the quality of the then-science it was based upon, the impact of footnote 11 continues to be 
profoundly felt in legal theory and practice. See also Lawrence, “The Id,” at 350-1, 362-3. 
32 See West, “12 Racist Men,” (2011).  
33 B. O’Brien and C. Grosso, “Report on Jury Selection Study,” University of Michigan College of Law Digital 
Commons, 1-17 (2011) at 11-17. 
34 West, “12 Racist Men” at 188-93. 
35 Krieger, “Content,” at 1226. 
36 See Faigman, et al., “Courtroom,” (2012). 
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in the language of proof, jury selection37, jury deliberation38, judicial education39, sentencing 
procedure40, precedent, legislation, language, reason, and right41. Likewise, we can look to the 
language of mens rea, culpability, scrutiny, admission, intent, so on, to recognize that the law 
lacks remedy for the probabilistic nature of prejudice42. If for no other reason than to insulate the 
law from avoidable mismemory biases or the unnecessary corruption of juvenile witnesses, as 
but two examples, it is in the interest of the legal practice to absorb the impact of evidence in 
brain sciences (At the time of writing, Black’s Law admits four types of bias; the Association of 
Psychological Science admits almost 200). The holdover view defends law as a bastion of 
excusable raced and gendered and classed inequalities43. More pointedly, it shelters those who 
benefit from the law as an enterprise of discrimination, and from the systemic prejudice it 
reinforces in its judgements44.  
Thinking that the law need not accommodate science in this way is a stance quickly 
dimming as the law becomes a more intensely politicized, economical machine. If there is merit 
to be extracted from the holdover view, it is from the latter objection – that the law is unable to 
accommodate such science. The rub is this: science begins with fact, law ends with fact. Science, 
even with evidences as well established as those listed, cannot grant the kind of certainty law 
requires to take as fact45. (Also for this reason, the law cannot be treated as purely as a scientific 
                                                      
37 D. Devine, Jury Decision Making: The State of Science, New York University Press (2012) at 41-60. 
38 Ibid at 152-80. 
39 See S. Strong, “Judicial Education and Regulatory Capture: Does the Current System of Educating Judges 
Promote a Well-Functioning Judiciary and Adequately Serve the Public Interest?” Journal of Dispute Resolution 
2015, 1-22 (2015).  
40 Devine, Jury, at 68-90. 
41 See J. Armour, “Stereotypes and Prejudice: Helping Legal Decisionmakers Break the Prejudice Habit,” California 
Law Review 83, 733-72 (1995). 
42 W. Dimock, “Rules of Law, Laws of Science,” Yale Journal of Law & Humanities 13, 203-25 (2001) at 204. 
43 Armour, “Stereotypes,” at 734-50. 
44 Lawrence, “The Id,” at 336-44. 
45 Dimock, “Rules” at 215-20. 
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methodology or civic technocracy46.) However, when bias is at least acknowledged dually as a 
cognitive and institutional phenomenon, not a normative motivation, the law that surrounds it 
becomes more mutable and forgiving47. There have been demonstrated ways in which the law 
may be read and exercised that do not require it to fundamentally change or fundamentally 
readdress its certainty principles but nonetheless accommodates a more accurate science48. 
Materializing this kind of gatekeeping decision49, in Title VII legal language and beyond, is a 
realistic next step in the modernizing the holdover view.  
 
The Interventional View of Bias 
If the holdover view states that the law should not acknowledge the science of prejudice, 
the interventional view swings the pendulum the other direction to say that the law might resolve 
the whole of the problem of prejudice. What has been offered by legal theorists50 and actors is a 
surface-level and only partially-informed idiomatic view of implicit bias. Despite the evidence 
already accumulated, there persists in the wider social narrative (in the popular science 
understanding) a notion of transparent or privileged access to one’s cognitive mechanisms of 
                                                      
46 Ibid at 205-6. 
47 Krieger, “Content,” at 1171-2. 
48 Instances of this kind of re-reading of the law are seen in Title VII cases Kimble v. Wisconsin Dept. of Workforce 
Development and McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch Co.; both judgements saw concepts of in-group bias, uncertainty 
principles, mis-memory reliability, stereotyping, and so on, in the vein of the interventional view (below), freely 
cited. The language of Title VII on disparate treatment – language which upon closer inspection trades conscious 
intent for actionable causation, a more realistic application of implicit bias science – serves to illuminate the ways in 
which the law may be read as more consistent with an ever-evolving science, without compromising precedent. 
Kimble ruled in concurrence with Title VII discrimination; McReynolds did not: Both cases, however, mark a huge 
departure from what is usually seen of the holdover view, and establish that intentionality does not any longer need 
to be tied to “conscious” intent (i.e., bias as a choice), and the burden of proof shifts away from the burden of 
production of motivation. This mindful re-reading does not jeopardize the rule of law nor require the judgement to 
admit extralegal heuristics, and moves a step closer to an accurate reflection of the science of prejudice by law in 
practice. See Kimble v. Wisconsin Department of Workforce Development 690 F. Supp.2d 765 (E.D. Wis. 2010) and 
McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. 11 7th Cir. 3639 (2012). 
49 See R. Harris, Black Robes, White Coats: The Puzzle of Judicial Policymaking and Scientific Evidence, Rutgers 
University Press: New Brunswick (1972), at 7-12. 
50 Those referenced herein including Kang, Krieger, Greenwald, Freeman, Lawrence, and others.  
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bias as allowing for intervention in the exercise of the resulting implicit bias. Within this 
narrative, the answers already seem to exist: through mindfulness and an increased awareness, 
the individual is capable of making himself appreciably less biased, effectively mediating his 
cognitive processes and subduing the felt effects of institutionally-born discrimination. Markets 
and media are reflective of this, being saturated with “4 Signs Racism may be an Issue in Your 
Workplace”51, “Bias-Proof Your Classroom Today”52, “A Fix for Gender Bias in Healthcare? 
Check!”53, and (most ambitiously) “10 Steps to Overcome Unconscious Bias”54. I am, as are 
many, skeptical that awareness – or thoughtfulness, or thoroughness, or intention – is ever 
enough a situation as this. That there is such a movement toward engaging in our individual 
subjectivity is not so much the problem as are the ways in which an interventional approach 
curtails hope for policy implementation, precedential change, or accountability from those 
institutions most readily perpetuating our systemic prejudices. To reiterate, implicit bias is not a 
cognitive choice, but a product of joint cognitive mechanics and institutional exposure:  
Because we so readily assume that people have privilege access to the content of their 
own thought processes, we may easily overlook the significance of this assumption of 
decisionmaker self-awareness. But if one thinks about it, one must immediately recognize 
the normative utility of a rule prohibiting discrimination depends entirely on the 
decisionmaker self-awareness. One can refrain from “discriminating” only to the extent 
that one can accurately identify the factors impelling one’s actions or desires. Absent 
decisionmaker self-awareness, the nondiscrimination principle – if framed as a 
prohibitory injunction “not to discriminate” – loses its normative mooring.55  
 
Implicit Association Tests (IAT) and other implicit bias measure are more accurate at predicting  
                                                      
51 J. Haughton, “4 Signs Racism may be an Issue in Your Workplace,” Chartered Management Institute (12 May 
2016). 
52 E. Hopkins and G. Thompson, Scholastic Teaching Content, “Bias-Proof Your Classroom,” Instructor 117, no. 4, 
32 (2008). 
53 J. Nordell, “A Fix for Gender Bias in Healthcare? Check!” The New York Times (11 January 2017). 
54 N. Goodman, “10 Steps to Overcome Unconscious Bias,” Association for Talent Development (2014). 
55 Krieger, ”Content,” at 1186. 
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certain types of behavioral schemas, including racism, sexism, ableism, an on, than explicit bias 
or self-report measures56. That this is the case cannot be understated: It points to, as accessibly as 
can be, that even the most introspective or informed among us cannot predict our biases or 
extinguish our prejudices57. Recall here that biases, especially implicit biases, cannot be thought 
away exactly because they are foundational to our decision-making processes. They are integral 
to our cognitive functionality and are essentially inaccessibly by the kind of mindfulness these 
fixes champion; at best, mindfulness is a post hoc runaround circling the issue, never meeting it 
directly.  
My stance here – that implicit bias is the un-slayable dragon to our knights of law and 
order – moves a step further than the theory offered in compliment to the interventional view. 
Where Krieger, Freeman, and Kang put forth that the implicit biases we harbor regardless of any 
contrary intention must be muzzled through further and greater intervention58, I venture that an 
interventional approach is somewhat futile. Implicit, or indeed explicit, bias is largely resultant 
of the political structuring and social performance of identity. The interventional view discounts 
not only the necessary nuances of implicit bias as cognitively foundational, but the confluence of 
cognitive mechanisms acting in reaction to systemic racism, sexism, and other prejudices. This 
overwhelming focus at the level of the individual – like calls for greater detection and screening 
of bias or selective modulation of decision-making conditions to deter biased tendencies – fails 
almost entirely to confront the social and historical impulses of discrimination. This misguided 
relationship between the brain and behavior is alternatively illustrated in the theory as a  
                                                      
56 L. Rudman, et al. “’Unlearning’ Automatic Biases: The Malleability of Implicit Prejudice and Stereotypes,” 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 81, 856-68 (2001) at 856-8; Kang, “Trojan Horses” at 1512-5. 
57 Including and especially those involved in the science: We do not pass IAT’s with any greater degree of 
impartiality than first-time testers, we only become privy to its predictive pattering and correlations.  
58 See Kang, “Trojan Horses,” (2005). 
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perpetrator-victim relationship, wherein   
the perpetrator perspective sees [discrimination] not as conditions, but as actions, or 
series of actions, inflicted on the victim by the perpetrator. The focus is more on what 
particular perpetrators have done or are doing to some victims that it is on the overall life 
situation of the victim class. The victim, or “condition”, conception of [discrimination] 
suggests that the problem will not be solved until the conditions associated with it have 
been eliminated. To remedy the condition of [discrimination] would demand affirmative 
efforts to change the condition. The remedial dimension of the perpetrator perspective, 
however, is negative. The task is merely to neutralize the inappropriate conduct of the 
perpetrator.59 
 
In the pursuit of a normatively ‘unbiased’ legal actor, be they judge or juror, the law on the 
whole continues to wrongly buttress the perpetrator perspective, and with it the systemic 
prejudices and implicit attitudes that find continued traction in the Petrazyckian lifeworld.  
 
False Aspirations of Objectivity 
Both the holdover and interventional view of prejudice and science in law illuminate the 
chief expectation in law of some normative equality, or achievable objective outcome. In either 
dismissing (holdover view) or resolving (interventional view) matters of bias there remains an 
underlying basis of prejudice in the court – that is, a biased and emotional court is inevitable 
(otherwise, these views would struggle to arise at all). I find it difficult to accept, when we 
acknowledge this implicitly biased nature of the court and its civic participants, the illusion that 
there might be objectively right or equitable answers beyond the subjective discretion of legal 
actors60 and decision-makers. An objective jury is in direct conflict with engaged civic 
participation. The injustice born from the maintenance of an illusory and counterproductive  
                                                      
59 A. Freeman, “Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through Anti-Discrimination Law: A Critical Review of 
Supreme Court Cases,” Minnesota Law Review 62, 1049-1119 (1978) at 1053, emphasis added. 
60 For an example of this kind of objectivity rhetoric in practice, reference the treatment of ethnicity and race by the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. See R. Wilson, “When Humanity Sits in Judgement” in In the Name of 
Humanity: The Government of Threat and Care, Duke University Press (2010) at 56-7. 
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aspiration to objectivity is the unifying thread between both views, especially as  
we take into account the negative implications about human capacity [and] civic dignity. 
The recognition of a person as a responsible member of a collective…[contradicts] the 
more than two centuries of egalitarian and emancipatory political action that shaped the 
institutions of Western democracies, most recently through the efforts of civil rights 
social movements.61  
 
It seems a paradox then that an egalitarian, emancipatory democracy should also call for civic 
participation that defers to a ‘right’ answer, or at least to one predetermined by the subjectivity of 
its ever-biased decision-makers62. I situate this at the crux of the difficulty in theoretically and 
practically reconciling social order – represented by jurors – with legal rules – judges – in the 
performative discourse of the courtroom63. Not only that, but too the reconciliation of the 
adversarial model of justice when juries are increasingly placed at the center of a triangulation 
between proof, precedent, and economy. (Juries, tradition tells us, are a moral arbiter, not 
determinant of guilt in adversarial justice.) The use of juries, and all of the unique particulars 
surrounding their use in the courtroom, present a concise model of bias-interactions that 
exemplify most clearly, I believe, the ways in which the legal tradition has failed to adequately 
address the science of prejudice. In the same breath, so too has it failed to fully realize the 
capacity of the jury body and their being autonomously subjective and critical; a symbolic, 
prescribed, or otherwise unengaged jury undercuts the role of civic participation in the court. The 
mere maintenance of an impossibly objective ideal of implicit bias in the courtroom and in the 
jury, as from either the holdover or the interventional view, appreciably makes justice less 
objective.  
  
                                                      
61 Dzur, Punishment, at 155-6. 
62 Leiter, “Objectivity,” at 200-2. 
63 B. Tamanaha, “A Concise Guide to the Rule of Law,” Legal Studies Research Paper Series 7, 2-20 (2007) at 10. 
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The Case for Juries, Just Not Expert Ones 
It has been my experience that dialogues surrounding implicit bias decision-making in the 
courtroom also include discussion as to the very need for the (human) jury: Why not eliminate 
entirely Aristophanes’ mortal quality of law64? Aside from the imaginable logistical limitations, 
any alternative process invites equally as many biases into the court (statistical, mechanical, 
computational, interpretational, representational, etc.65). The institution of the jury, as it exists 
now, aligns with both of the touchstone functions of the rule of law; to “hold governing officials 
to the law” (the vertical function) and to “resolve disputes between citizens according to the law” 
(the horizontal function)66. The jury represents a unique kind of transmorphing of citizen 
responsibility: 
Voters never have the individual offenders before their eyes; they are never in a position 
to feel the Montequieian impulse toward mercy. Ordinary voters are never capable of the 
routinized, sober, and merciful approach to punishment that is the stuff of the daily work 
of punishment professionals.67  
 
When civic dignity is confronting and participatory in this way, it moves from a plebiscitary or 
advocatory model of participation68 to a more direct and pointed engagement with legal decision-
making – what is called ‘load-bearing participation’69. Load-bearing participation is more 
directly engaged because it allows for and requires a greater exercise of subjectivity and 
responsibility on the part of the juror. Jury-less justice, or even systems lite on load-bearing 
                                                      
64 Dzur, Punishment, at 154. 
65 Though not conscious, I would call these implicit in their nature as well.  
66 Tamanaha, “Guide,” at 14. 
67 Dzur, Punishment, at 152. 
68 A fine example of this plebiscitary/advocatory versus load-bearing engagement is exemplified in California’s 
Three Strikes policy and voter initiatives since the early 1990s. For more on this, see Dzur, Punishment, at 158-63. 
69 This is defined as follows: “Plebiscitary participation is uninformed, immune to other’s perspectives, and 
undermining – requiring merely a signature or a ballot. Advocacy may well be informed and may demand 
significant time, but is unconcerned with anything but a specific cause or person. Load-bearing participation is 
exposed to a range of information, other’s opinions, and holds the agent responsible for a collective outcome.” See 
Dzur, Punishment, at 163. 
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forms of participation, runs the steep risk of undermining the perceived legitimacy of the 
objective legal system70. 
A more operative iteration of this jury-less stance is the argument for expert juries, either 
in the case of experts as jurors or jurors as needing an acquired expertise71. Expert systems of 
judicial decision-making may be argued in a strong and weak form72. In the strong form, the 
expert benefits over and above the layperson in his knowledge, which affords him the ability to 
“nullify” his passions; he is simply better outfitted to do objective justice than the common juror. 
In the weak form, the system of justice is so equipped, not the individual. Of these, however, the 
strong form is  
less defensible than it might appear and leads to an unappealing loss of [civic dignity], 
among other hazards. [The weak form] is less reliant on the dominant role for 
professionals and experts than is often thought and indeed demands more rather than less 
citizen involvement.73  
 
Expert systems of justice therein demonstrate a counterproductive and rightly cautions view of 
scientific idolatry and cloistered technocracy – those tendencies that also draw out law-as-a-
science arguments74. Without accountability from non-expert legal actors, the institution is free 
to become recursively insular (as has been seen in the sciences), where any decision-making is 
based purely on the subjective discretion of its decision-makers. In either of these jury-less 
pictures, the call for jurors to be separated from their subjectivity as civilians is problematic: 
Jurors cannot be only confined to a prescriptive objectivity of law, nor should they be any more 
                                                      
70 Restorative justice programs in Australia and New Zealand and the jury models exercised in Japan, South Korea, 
and Canada indicate as much: “Contemporary justice programs require deeper roots in civic culture attending to the 
problems of both crime and punishment” and rehabilitation and remedy to be effective and lasting. See Dzur, 
Punishment, at 159. 
71 The same goes for using judges in an expert system.  
72 Dzur, Punishment, at 151-2. 
73 Ibid at 152. 
74 Kane, “Integrity,” at 115-39. 
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removed from the process of decision-making than any other actor. Empirically and 
theoretically, the jury becomes most unreliable and unproductive when it is only a symbolic 
exercise of engagement with the law75. The jury as it exists now may not be the most efficient 
means of load-bearing participation, but it is nonetheless an effective and legitimizing 
intervention between the vertical and horizontal functions of the law76.  
  
Bias-Grooming 
Bias-grooming techniques appear throughout our social and legal institutions. Relevant to 
the court, the American Bar Association has its “Achieving an Impartial Jury Toolbox”, a sixty 
page review published in 2014 as a part of its Implicit Bias Initiative that includes resources like 
“Ten Quick Tips for De-Biasing” and a “Mindful Courtroom Checklist”. The National Center for 
State Courts and the State Justice Institute have each instituted their educational pilot programs 
that zero in on an optimistic and highly sanitized neuroscience. Even Starbucks mandated 
nationwide racial-bias training at an eight-figure cost that borrows much of the same science in 
much of the same way77. Techniques range in scale and scope from surveys to orientation 
materials to workshops and trainings to research access to intervention and advising resources, 
aimed at every level of the court but concentrated at the level of civic participants. It is important 
to note that these initiatives, though created for institutional-level reform, are a means of 
individual reformation at explicit levels of prejudice; they almost exclusively approach (in design 
and/or in practice) implicit bias through the mistakenly virtuous lens of the interventional view78- 
                                                      
75 Devine, Jury, at 230-1. 
76 See Strong, “Judicial Education,” (2015). 
77 Bias-grooming and diversity initiatives like Starbucks’ are used by nearly half of all midsize U.S. corporations 
and by nearly every Fortune 500. For more on this, see Dobbin and Kaley, “Why Diversity Programs Fail,” (2016).  
78 Armour, “Prejudice,” at 760-66. 
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which is to say, through an ineffectual consciousness-raising of the individual without regard to 
institutional influence. To them I have four main objections.  
First, the normative objectivity sought through bias-grooming is not entirely possible 
without bias or even prejudice. Even without inviting complications of philosophy or legal 
theory, we see that rational or objective decision-making is impaired or inhibited at the 
neurostructural level absent functional emotive centers of the brain79. More macro but neurologic 
all the same, for example, is the use of photography in the court, a fairly well-represented facet 
of legal psychology. Photographic evidence as presented to a jury is the single most persuasive 
piece of indirect evidence that can be admitted80. Everything from the OJ Simpson blood 
evidence to the minute-by-minute coverage of the Sayfullo Saipov terror attack in 2017, 
gruesome or graphic crime scene photos reliably invoke a heightened emotive, cognitive, and 
prejudicial response from legal actors regardless of experience or familiarity. This is above and 
beyond the effects of even the most personally effecting testimony and may be on its own 
responsible for increased punitiveness in juror and judge decision-making. Emotionally 
antagonized judgements as these are seen to result in lesser (actively) effortful, and thus less 
reliable, cognition81. Here, increased emotional salience reflexively motivates juror positive-
rehabilitation and (increased) negative-retribution schemas, predisposing jurors to follow the 
lead of their implicit biases. Objections to include photography in the court echo objections to 
emotionality, but the law is hard-pressed to go without either: There is no rational or reasonable 
means by which the court can referee the exercise (or exclusion) of emotionality or provide an 
emotionally-predetermined environment within which to conduct justice. Though we see from 
                                                      
79 See R. Gupta, et al. “The Amygdala and Decision Making,” Neuropsychologica 49, 760-6 (2011). 
80 Reference J. Mnookin, “The Image of Truth: Photographic Evidence and the Power of Analogy,” Journal of Law 
and the Humanities 10, 1-74 (1998). 
81 Gupta, et al. “The Amygdala,” (2011); Kang, “Trojan Horses,” at 1510-1. 
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the science that some ideal emotionality may reduce biased judgement, bias-grooming has little – 
if any – capacity to enforce that.    
My second objection lies within the very conceptualization of these types of techniques 
and the stereotype-congruence they emphasize82. Bias-grooming is ineffectual because it so 
deeply rooted in interventional notion of transparency of mind on the part of the individual. This 
a perfunctory pathologizing of the individual (the actor) without healing the system (the law), 
and the system must be attended to with equally as much fervor. Racism discrimination, as just 
one specific bias, is a systemic, socially- and historically-integrated pandemic that moves far 
beyond the singular individual83 – recall here the perpetrator perspective. IAT-related evidence 
quantifies that bias against African Americans is held nearly equally by Caucasians as by African 
Americans. Asian Americans are biased against Asian Americans to a lesser but similar degree, 
and the same goes for Hispanic populations. Similar cases can be made for gender and sexuality 
prejudices, age, religion, class, and more84. Prejudice itself has splintered away from the 
individual, so as long as the focus of these techniques remains on the individual, they miss the 
mark. They take up only part of a problem that forever continues to find ammunition elsewhere, 
in greater and equal measure85.   
Third is that, though they claim a scientific understanding of bias and prejudice, these 
techniques are by and large unscientific. These materials do not abide by conventions of follow-
up study for subsequent intervention to adapt and modify them; without this kind of longitudinal 
attention and accountability, they are relatively worthless to the wider picture of bias-‘reduction’. 
                                                      
82 Armour, “Prejudice,” at 755-7. 
83 Lawrence, “The Id,” at 356-62. 
84 See Nosek, “Pervasiveness,” (2007).  
85 See I. Haney López, Dog Whistle Politics: How Coded Racial Appeals have Reinvented Racism and Wrecked the 
Middle Class, Oxford University Press (2015) at 35. 
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They often politicize topical issues of identity like race and sex, given their proximity to the 
politicization of the judiciary; this generally diminishes their autonomy and ability to be 
responsible to burgeoning science. The implementation of these techniques and materials is in no 
way regulated, so when left as a discretionary matter, there is little incentive for them to be 
included at all; the practical scope of bias-grooming (through duration, participation, or 
regularity) is extremely limited, so much so that it is too subtle a cognitive manipulation to 
establish any lasting effects86. The language of these materials typically falls on the side furthest 
away from clinical legalese (so far away it is beyond merely making them more accessible); as 
above, this is a disservice to the necessary complexities of both science and law, and 
underestimates and undermines the capacity of the juror to engage with either. These techniques 
ostensibly draw from the very inequalities they seek to dispel; to reduce prejudice, jurors are 
faced with an unexpected crucible of admitting their own implicit attitudes (something, as least 
in our current political and social climate, I would certainly argue that most people are unwilling 
to advertise to a room of their colleagues or fellow jurors during one of these workshops87. There 
is ample latitude within these techniques where individuals may hide, and in keeping the 
dialogue of prejudice sterilized in this way, they continue to perpetuate the notion of objectively 
‘fixable’ prejudices88, thus reinforcing the opacity of existing intergroup and implicit biases89). 
Each of these is another hitch in a worthy quest for a lesser prejudiced law and only distances 
law further still from the accurate science necessary to do so. Even from the interventional view,  
                                                      
86 See F. Dobbin, et al. “Diversity Management in Corporate America,” Contexts 6, 21-7 (2007). 
87 This is reiterated by creators Banaji and Greenwald in the conceptualization of the IAT: “IAT scores are best 
considered as medical data or votes. A person may share them, but should not be expected or asked to share with 
others at this point.” The IBT and AIJ falsely assumes the court is a “non-intimidating atmosphere where potential 
jurors are sufficiently comfortable to answer openly or to ask to discuss separately” matters of IAT scores and 
implicit bias measures, and, though bias-grooming materials, generally expects this kind of engagement.  
88 West, “12 Racist Men,” at 170. 
89 See Dobbin, et al. “Diversity,” (2007). 
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these interventions are not robust enough.   
Finally, I take issue with the technocratic means by which these kinds of bias-grooming 
methods have arisen90. I have established the harms of an exclusively expert system and have 
reiterated the common-sensical and theoretical issue that juries cannot be (expected to be) 
experts. As with those, there are considerable limitations and cautions that come with bias-
grooming and diversity training. The science these initiatives are based on is itself problematic as 
it is, of course, a culturally bound way of knowing, and represents a matrix of intersectional 
injustices in representation, interpretation, coercive and selective involvement, and so on. 
Scientific empiricism as a human enterprise, particularly when applied to the law, exacerbates all 
too easily testimonial and hermeneutical oppressions91. Moreover, the industry that is diversity 
and inclusion initiatives is, while facially neutral, an industry nonetheless: Diversity workshops 
and implicit bias seminars are a privatized and (extremely) profitable capitalization upon a 
never-ending need, a need that that industry can and does predictively modulate to produce 
further need and further gain. These techniques groom away the official, endorsed, agreed types 
of racism or sexism as a sort of ideological scapegoat instead of legitimately challenging the 
discrimination occurring among us92.  
The law displaces it due responsibility and accountability for prejudice to institutional 
and systemic prejudices outside of the court, but it is not alone in the pervasion of bias – 
technocratic civics and democratized science are both culpable. For this weight to rest entirely on 
the knowledge-producers of the academy, or on the citizen public, is unreasonable93. Though the 
                                                      
90 Dzur, Punishment, at 130-1. 
91 Kane, “Integrity,” at 115-134. 
92 See J. Melamed, Represent and Destroy: Rationalizing Violence in the New Racial Capitalism, University of 
Minnesota Press (2011). 
93 Kane, “Integrity,” at 117-33. 
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statistics are still infantile, these four objections offer some direction as to why bias-reduction 
techniques have not been seen to produce the expected longitudinal change in the court.  
 
In Action 
Some of the most noteworthy of these bias-grooming techniques in the court are the ABA 
Implicit Bias Initiative and implicit bias training videos by the District Court of Washington, for 
jurors, and by the Association’s Diversity and Inclusion 360 Commission, for judges, public 
defenders, and prosecutors. In examining these with a finer tooth, the above objections are seen 
in action.  
The ABA’s Implicit Bias Toolbox (IBT)94 and “Achieving an Impartial Jury” Toolbox 
(AIJ)95, released initially in 2013, can be linked to more emblematic diversity training-type 
resources. They are often paired together, the IBT being the more peripheral and the AIJ being 
more essential to the work of jury selection and judgement, and both are focused on the ABA’s 
claim of ‘de-biasing’ and making objective jurors at work. Both are designed to be implemented 
at the discretion of legal leaders, actors, and teachers, and neither require or are designed to 
include a scientific or academic presence during the training or administration of the training (the 
AIJ in fact does not necessarily require any administrator and can be utilized by the individual 
alone) (objection four). Both rely upon the interventional view of transparency of mind and 
much of the heavy lifting to expose bias and this transparency of mind to the participant is done 
through IAT testing96 (objection two). Even with an ideally transparent mind, they attempt to 
                                                      
94 Diversity and Inclusion 360 Commission, American Bar Association, “Implicit Bias Toolbox,” posted by the 
American Bar Association, Implicit Bias Initiative (2013). 
95 Diversity and Inclusion 360 Commission, American Bar Association, “Achieving an Impartial Jury Toolbox,” 
posted by the American Bar Association, Implicit Bias Initiative (2013). 
96 IAT testing, even by the admission of its creators, is not equipped to select bias-free juries or determine on its own 
the significance of implicit bias in an individual. Though the IAT is the most widely utilized and practiced form of 
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leverage and compartmentalize implicit bias: The AIJ specifically exploits many of the 
administrator’s and participant’s existing intergroup biases, over-contextualizes social 
information processing, and excuses, utilizes, and furthers informal stereotyping of participants 
and courts when that stereotyping mitigates more formal discriminatory action (objection one)97.  
Not for naught, the ABA’s Toolboxes do include some valid points. As compared to the 
interventional view of bias, the IBT and AIJ are certainly more informed by relevant and topical 
science98. Nevertheless, both tools significantly overestimate their own efficacy over time, again 
attributable in part to their lack of (legitimately) scientific bases (objection three). When the 
court does utilize bias-grooming techniques, they are designed to be mandatory, prescriptive, and 
one-sided. Here I take a page from Starbucks’ book and examine this in terms of the diversity 
training most widely seen in business: Diversity training is highly effective in theory99 and 
highly ineffective in practice100. Any long-term improvement in hiring or recruitment – mirrored 
in jury selection and decision-making – is typically negligible over time and, when training is 
made mandatory, workplace effects are null, if not (more likely) negative101. This may well be 
due to those same issues of conceptualization seen in the above objections. To summarize, 
diversity training is ineffective because it assumes transparency of mind, occurs exclusively at 
                                                      
implicit bias testing, it is not without its significant faults, namely the potential for confounding statistical noise. 
This reiterates the point that the kind of catch-all safeguard the law seeks does not exist (or at least not yet). For 
more on this, see A. Greenwald, et al. “Understanding and Using the Implicit Association Test: III Meta-Analysis of 
Predictive Validity,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 97, 17-41 (2009). 
97 See C. Kaiser, et al. “Presumed Fair: Ironic Effects of Organizational Diversity Structures,” Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology 104, 504-19 (2013). 
98 Jerry Kang’s version of the Toolbox, the Implicit Bias Primer for Courts produced in conjunction with the 
NCSC’s court and jury education program, is more successful at avoiding an unnecessary distilling of the science 
and relevant distinctions; his is less widely utilized, I would argue, for precisely this reason.  
99 Much of the positive effects of diversity initiatives at this scale are attributable to their impact on market 
reception. Starbucks’ prioritization to dialogues surrounding diversity and equality, even at the high cost of their 
programs, demonstrates a shared progressive commitment to the wider social call for anti-discrimination, 
irrespective of how their trainings manifest in later customer interactions. 
100 See Kaiser “Presumed Fair,” (2013); E. Paluck and D. Green, “Prejudice Reduction: What Works?” Annual 
Review of Psychology 60, 339-67 (2009). 
101 Kaiser, “Presumed Fair” at 13-14; see also Dobbins and Kaley, “Why Diversity,” (2016). 
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the level of the individual consciousness, and requires that individual to reframe and focus his 
prejudices on intergroup relations102, usually at the detriment of singling out a particular group 
within that schema like women or African Americans103. His subjectivity becomes clinical and 
legalistic in its prescriptive terms, and any longitudinal accountability that is successfully 
embedded is repercussive or socially threatening. (Compare this with the typical diversity 
taskforce: the former is commonly conducted by some authority outside of the institution, uses 
contractually for-profit science, is contextually independent of the institution, and implemented 
consequences are made public, while the latter is in-house, entirely contextually dependent, is 
integrated into the economy of the institution, and its consequences are normally focused inward 
within that institution. It should not come as a surprise that task forces are usually the more 
longitudinally successful of the two104, nor that the ABA’s existing narratives are far more 
likened to trainings than taskforces.) When ‘de-biasing’ techniques 
eliminate people’s freedom to value diversity on their own terms, they may actually be 
creating hostility toward the targets of prejudice…Controlling prejudice reduction 
practices are tempting because they are quick and easy to implement. They tell people 
how they should think and behave and stress the negative consequences of failing to think 
and behave in desirable ways…But people need to feel that they are freely choosing to be 
nonprejudiced, rather than having it forced upon them.105  
 
If we look at this from a wider lens, diversity training and bias-grooming are less about the 
institution – the business or the court – defining the individual as they are about the individual 
defining the law of that institution. (Note that, unlike in business, there is no comparable system 
of grievance for jurors and actors in the court.) It tests the tensile strength of the institution to 
                                                      
102 Kaiser, “Presumed Fair,” at 7. 
103 Not to mention the frustrating issue of, in the practical implementation of these techniques, the framing of “the 
diversity issue” as problematic because of these groups, and that onus of righting these problems is placed upon 
those demographics of interpersonal interactions.  
104 See F. Dobbin and A. Kaley, “Why Diversity Programs Fail,” Harvard Business Review 94, 52-60 (2016). 
105 L. Legault, quoted in “Ironic Effects of Anti-Prejudice Messages,” Association of Psychological Sciences, 6 July 
2011.  
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serve the individual, to respond, and to be passionately attentive. Its calls for procedural and 
systemic change are a result of equal engagement by the individual as by the institution106. As 
counterintuitive as it seems, it is by making jury training and bias-training voluntary, and by 
getting a foot in the door to invite subjectivity and bias, that the jury stands a fighting chance at 
efficacious civic representation and engagement. Voluntary bias interference instead reinforces 
behavioral salience trends including subjective identification (contact hypothesis), self-efficacy 
and -accountability measures, and domain identification in the simulated environment of the 
court, versus prejudicial stereotyping107. Indeed by preventing jury compositional manipulations 
of any kind – even those that aim to replace a more biased juror with a lesser biased one – our 
bias-grooming begins to resemble more of a taskforce108; there is no guarantee of fully 
representational engagement, but we wedge the door open the smallest bit further.   
In the years immediately following the AIJ, Washington State introduced its 
“Understanding the Effects of Unconscious Bias” training video109, the country’s first implicit-
bias based instructional video addressed directly to jurors and mandated in both District houses 
in Seattle and Tacoma. It is based on much of the same content of the AIJ, some of it lifted 
directly, and draws particularly from those sections on jury selection and instructional dialogues. 
The video beings: “It is the court’s goal in every jury trial to find jurors who will decide the case 
before them without prejudice or bias…so that you can be sure you are making objective 
decisions”110 (a parrot of AIJ’s proposed juror instruction111). It continues:  
                                                      
106 Devine, Jury, at 211-20. 
107 Paluck and Green, “Prejudice Reduction,” at 345-57. 
108 West, “12 Racist Men,” at 197-99. 
109 See J.A. J. Coughenour, et al. “Understanding the Effects of Unconscious Bias,” U. S. District Court, Western 
District of Washington video, 11:00, posted by The Marshall Project (2017). 
110 Ibid at 0:17. 
111 Diversity and Inclusion 360 Commission, American Bar Association, “Achieving,” at 22. 
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If and when we stop to consciously think about it, we might decide our initial [implicit 
biases] don’t actually fit with the information we are being presented with and with what 
we really know to be fair.112 
 
Alone this line flags problems with bias-grooming techniques. One, it mistakes implicit bias 
again as an unintentional and accessibly cognitive phenomenon and assumes a noble 
Dworkonian view of some objectively right answer or truth in regards to decision-making and 
sentencing113. It grapples with prejudice here and throughout similarly to the interventional view 
but offers no concrete means of intervention, instead encouraging (unaccountable) reflexive 
meditation on one’s prejudices and behaviors. Two, it assumes that the individual is not only 
aware, or can be made aware, of his implicit and explicit biases, but that he has the capacity to 
place them in direct and thoughtful contrast to his conception of ‘right’ and just114, and to apply 
that to naturalistic contexts (i.e., he is self-regulating his own racism, sexism, etc. because he 
recognizes from the law a fundamentally more “right” prescribed subjectivity than his own115.) 
The individual juror is therefore expected to supply the court with an extralegal rationality of 
logic; the juror is no longer the arbiter of guilt, he is the subjective and democratic standard by 
which guilt is decided116. It requires the individual to respond and be attentive to the law, rather 
than vice versa (as above).  
Well intentioned as it may be, the video’s sentiments erode further in its three tenants of 
being an ‘unbiased’ juror: (1) “Know that unconscious bias exists and occurs for all of us” 
(valid), (2) “Carefully examine our decisions and judgements as jurors” (this is valid so long as 
it is limited to explicit decision-making and biases), and (3) “Question our decisions by asking 
                                                      
112 Ibid at 2:50. 
113 B. Lieter, “Objectivity and the Problems of Jurisprudence,” Texas las Review 72, 187-209 (1993) at 201-2. 
114 B. Massumi, Politics of Affect, Polity Press (2015) at 86-93. 
115 O. Fiss, The Law as it Could Be, New York University Press (2003) at 152-5. 
116 West, “12 Racist Men,” at 200-3. 
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whether they would be different if the witness, lawyer, or person on trial were of a different race, 
age, or gender” (this is borrowed from the AIJ and exploits those same stereotyping mechanisms 
that reinforce bias117)118. “Understanding the Effects of Unconscious Bias” harkens back to those 
issues of the interventional view and further reiterates the failings of examining one’s own biases 
in an effort to eliminate them. The final tenant assumes perhaps too much of the juror in his 
capacity to segregate his objectivity from his subjective and biased (though not necessarily 
prejudiced) decision-making. 
The ABA also supplies judges, public defenders, and prosecutors with similar training 
videos; the “Hidden Injustice” series119. While it is encouraging that these are considerably more 
accurately informed than the IBT, they are worryingly more provocative, essentially taking two 
steps back for each step forward (even more worryingly, the science provided is done so 
exclusively by legal actors and scholars). The series has its own three tenants of being an 
‘unbiased’ judge, arguably hedged too greatly on unreliable IAT evidence120: humility (“it is 
paradoxically only by being humble and recognizing that you are deeply fallible that you can 
actually become more objective”121), prudence (“[you] should be most on guard when [you] are 
under pressure to decide quickly…be mindfully intentional about your equality”122), and 
intentionality (“if you are highly motivated to avoid discriminatory behavior and that motivation 
doesn’t come from external requirements…that internal motivation does matter a lot”123). “Bias 
                                                      
117 Diversity and Inclusion 360 Commission, American Bar Association, “Achieving,” at 23. 
118 Coughenour, “Unconscious,” at 9:20. 
119 For judges; see J. Kang, et al. “Hidden Injustice: Bias on the Bench,” ABA Legal News Network video, 10:43, 
posted by American Bar Association (2016). For public offenders; see “Hidden Injustice, Toward a Better Defense,” 
ABA Legal News Network video, 12:45, posted by the American Bias Association (2016). For prosecutors, see J. 
Kang, et al. “Hidden Injustice: The Prosecutor’s Paradox,” ABA Legal News Network video, 14:06, posted by the 
American Bias Association (2016). 
120 See Greenwald, et al. “Meta-Analysis,” (2009). 
121 Kang, et al., “Hidden Injustice: Bias on the Bench,” at 4:17. 
122 Ibid at 5:05. 
123 Ibid at 5:50. 
Roderique, 30 
 
 
on the Bench” befalls the same hazards as “Understanding the Effects of Unconscious Bias”: 
“Implicit bias is a bit like an emotional reaction and you can detect that if you see it 
happening…We all have implicit biases and unless we work hard to counter them they have the 
potential of surfacing and effecting judgements that all of us make”124. At the risk of again 
reiterating the interventional view, the series sanitizes the cognitive and institutional realities of 
implicit bias and assures a negligently and optimistically corrigible outlook.  
In this blinkered approach to implicit bias, neither the ABA nor District Court require of 
legal actors and the institution of law a comparable kind of accountability for any address of the 
rampant and well-documented manipulations of jury compositions, systemic juror suppression, 
voter oppression and access, cross-race-like effects that distort conviction rates, trends in cross-
sectional negative-retribution and positive-rehabilitation judgement rates, problematic policing 
practices, and more. Their interventions reflect an increasingly better-informed view of implicit 
bias, but even so are lack to long-term rigor to constitute any lasting cognitive, behavioral, or 
structural change. Though “Understanding the Effects of Unconscious Bias” enjoyed a positive 
reception District-wide, its mandate was brief: It was barred from voir dire in Thomas v. 
Cannon125, another fatal instance of racially-motivated police brutality, on the basis of the video 
being “simply too prejudicial” in the context of the case. Thomas affirms that that bias-grooming 
techniques, however effective or ineffective they may or may not be to the juror in either a 
situational or naturalistic context, are up against the bigger foe of courtroom economy and 
                                                      
124 Ibid at 7:00. 
125 289 F. Supp.3d 1182 (2018). Leonard Thomas, a Black man then-unarmed, was killed in 2013 by Washington 
SWAT during a civil dispute at his home. The $15 million jury verdict for Thomas was upheld during retrial and is 
among the largest in the state’s history. Judge Barbara Rothstein cited the video being too inflammatory for viewing 
because of the racially-charged arguments on both sides: “The plaintiffs intended to argue that the officers were 
affected by racial bias” and the defense intended to argue the use of force was justified and that “jurors [would be 
unfairly] influenced by [social] racial factors, and could not return to their communities and say they found in favor 
of ‘white cops that shot an unarmed black man’”. For more on this, reference M. Carter, “Jury Awards More than 
$15 to Family of Unarmed Black Man Killed by SWAT Sniper in Fife,” Seattle Times, 14 July 2017. 
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politics – they cannot be expected to stand firmly against, much less overcome, things so 
systemic as prejudicially-motivated intrapersonal and interpersonal behaviors126. Aspirations to 
objectivity are not immune to them, despite whatever their intention. Objectivity, together with 
subjectivity, must be considered from a holistic perspective. The videos, the IBT and AIJ, and 
resources like it, are the product of the law’s jumping on an oversold and under-scrutinized, 
intensely particular filament of research on prejudice, and they reflect a glossy, palatable, 
temptingly idealized (and irresponsible) account of implicit bias127.   
 
More Harm Than Good 
My greatest concern with bias-grooming is a fundamental and fundamentally personal 
one that has been divided since the beginning in the science and evidence. I am of the 
persuasion, defeating as it may be, that one cannot better his implicit biases; the individual 
cannot control his biases or make them any less pervasive in his subjective experience. The best 
the individual can do is reflexively modulate his thoughts and behaviors based on a sociocultural 
contextualization (not his subjective experience of socioculture)128. This is an argument for 
malleability129, not resolution, and such behavioral change can occur absent ever a change in 
prejudice itself130: 
Altering [structural] associations would presumably have general, long-term 
consequences, while contextual changes and behavioral strategies for altering expression 
would have specific, short-term consequences…[We cannot currently know whether] the 
effects [of bias-intervention] reflect situational short-term malleability or general, long-
term change…The degree to which prejudice reduction persists after completion of the 
                                                      
126 Devine, Jury, at 181-210. 
127 See Faigman, et al., “Courtroom,” (2012). 
128 C. Lai, et al. “Reducing Implicit Prejudice,” Social and Personality Psychology Compass 7, 315-30 (2013) at 
318-9. 
129 See I. Blair, “The Malleability of Automatic Stereotypes and Prejudice,” Personality and Social Psychology 
Review 6: 242-61 (2002). 
130 Lai, “Implicit Prejudice,” at 321-4. 
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intervention is unknown…The existing literature provides solid evidence for implicit 
prejudice malleability, but little and mixed evidence for “long-term” implicit prejudice 
change.131 
 
The frontiers of brain and social sciences – and I do realize it is at the emergent frontiers that this 
occurs – reveals that in this present moment we are a people quantifiably more discriminatory, 
more competent in our discrimination, quicker to judge on the basis of prejudices, and more 
readily neurocognitively affected by matters of identity132. Our subjective experience of the 
world is encroached upon by identities not our own (and, like our politics, it is of greater value to 
conform to external identities to be objectively ‘right’ than to be engaged in our performative 
subjectivity). I, we, stand little chance to legitimately effect our subjectivity and implicit 
prejudices when we are combatting an overwhelming tide of cultural hyper-contextualization and 
inescapable automatic stereotype activation133.  
Not to be mistaken, there is value in understanding the ways in which we are influenced 
by bias, even at the most subterranean levels of consciousness; this is not to say that we cannot 
or should not attend to our biases. There is also value in consciously examining how this 
influence manifests in our explicit judgements, interactions, and decision-making134. I do not 
deny that there could eventually be realized ways to become sincerely less discriminatory as the 
science grows further135, but there is little evidence now to suggest that this is accomplishable by 
way of bias-grooming or diversity training (or indeed within the confines of the current scientific 
knowledge of implicit bias)136. The adversarial system that is our objective model of justice 
                                                      
131 Ibid at 322. 
132 Nosek, et al. “Pervasiveness,” at 40-2; see also G. Willard, et al. “Some Evidence for the Nonverbal Contagion of 
Racial Bias,” Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 128, 96-107 (2015). 
133 Lai, “Implicit Prejudice,” at 324. 
134 See P. Devine, et al. “Long-term Reduction in Implicit Race Bias: A Prejudice Habit-Breaking Intervention,” 
Journal of Experimental Psychology 48, 1267-78 (2012). 
135 Rudman, “’Unlearning,’” at 866. 
136 These sentiments are reiterated by emerging empirical work, but it is necessary to note that “while there are many 
demonstrations of implicit prejudice change based on distinct mechanisms, little is known about the constraints and 
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seeks, by its own admission, objective truth in the pursuit of some gains that carry no requisite of 
justness or fairness. It will be accomplishable by a considerable and consistent effort on the part 
of the entirety of our legal system, our politics, our science, our media, our civic accountability 
and dignity, everything that does and will motivate our biopsychosocial subjective experience. It 
will be accomplishable when the transformation of the integrity of our subjective experience is 
not degraded by our performance of it.  
 
Conclusion  
The best I can offer is entre into critical conversation: As law and science continue to 
converge, I think there is much to be said of the ways in which we choose to move forward now, 
most notably for the ways in which we give up the search for a normative objectivity in law and 
instead take up the search for those mechanisms of bias – not prejudice – which could serve 
justice more constructively. It is assured that implicit bias will not vacate the court so long as the 
court remains a human endeavor, so it becomes necessary that there exists space within which 
the law may thoughtfully and subjectively engage with bias; it must be reexamined the wider 
implications of prejudice as they surface structurally and systemically. Beyond brain or legal 
sciences, this is a challenge issued collectively, urgently, to legislation, cultural studies, politics, 
industry, intersectional and minority projects, to everyone standing at the door of the law137. 
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